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CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS IN
THE PRE-AWARD PHASE OF PUBLIC
TENDERING©
By

PETER DEVONSHIRE*

The law of public tendering has received vigorous
scrutiny since the Supreme Court of Canada's
landmark decision in R. v. Ron Engineering. The
Supreme Court's two-contract model re-defined the
juristic boundaries of the tendering process, imposing a
scheme of obligations in what was formerly regarded as
a pre-contractual phase of the transaction. This article
considers the ramifications of this development, with
particular reference to the relationship between
discretionary functions and legal duty. It is argued that
the dynamics of tendering do not conveniently mesh
with formal contract analysis and that the vision of Ron
Engineering has been sustained by recourse to broader
doctrines of fairness and good faith.

Le droit des soumissions publiques a 6 scrut6
vigoureusement depuis l'arr~t de principe de la Cour
supreme dans . c. Ron Engineering. Le mod le en
deux contrats de la Cour supreme a red6fini les balises
juridiques du processus de soumission, imposant un
processus d'obligations qui 6tait auparavant pergu
comme une phase pr~contractuelle de la transaction.
Cet article consid~re les ramifications de ce
d~veloppement, en se ref~rant particuliarement A la
relation entre les fonctions discr~tionnaires et le devoir
legal. I1 soutient que la dynamique de ]a soumission ne
concorde pas avec I'analyse contractuelle formelle et
que la vision de Ron Engineeringfut maintenue par les
recours aux doctrines plus larges de I'quit6 et de la
bonne foi.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is trite that the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in R. v.
Ron Engineering & Construction (Eastern)Ltd.1 has had profound
ramifications on the judicial view of public tendering. In rejecting
traditional analysis, 2 Ron Engineeringpropounded a distinct contractual
model based on the formation of preliminary and final contracts (termed
contracts A and B respectively). On this scheme, a request for tenders
constitutes an offer by the owner. 3 The submission of a conforming bid

becomes an acceptance on the terms specified in the tender call.4 The
preliminary contract5 prescribes the manner in which the owner is to
1 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 111 [hereinafterRonEngineering].
2 Formerly a request for tenders was regarded as an invitation to treat, creating no contractual
obligations on the part of the owner. The submission of a bid constituted an offer which the owner
was at liberty to accept or reject. If the owner elected to accept a particular tender, a binding
contract was then concluded with the successful bidder. See A.G. Guest, ed., Anson's Law of
Contract, 26th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984) at 26; 1.Goldsmith, CanadianBuilding Contracts,3d
ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1983) at 19-20; Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 9, 4th ed. (London:
Butterworths, 1980), para. 230; I.N.D. Wallace, ed., Hudson's Building and EngineeringContracts,
11th ed., vol. 1 (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) at 1.019,3.053; G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract,
9th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) at 14-15; and A.G. Guest, ed., Chitty on Contracts, 27th
ed., vol. 1 (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1994), paras. 2-013, 2-022.
3 The term "owner" denotes the party inviting bids.
4 Contract A arises immediately on the submission of a bid. See Ron Engineering,supra note 1
at 121. The principal terms of the contract include: (i) the irrevocability of the bid for a specified
period, (ii) the owner's obligation to consider all conforming bids in accordance with the conditions
of tender, (iii) the owner's qualified obligation to accept the lowest tender, (iv) the mutual
obligation of owner and successful bidder to enter into contract B, and (v) the bidder's right to
recover any tender deposit if the bid is not accepted.
5 Contract A was characterized as a unilateral contract. This formulation has attracted
vigorous academic criticism. See J. Blom, "Mistaken Bids: The Queen in right of Ontariov. Ron
Engineering&Construction (Eastern)Ltd." (1981-82) 6 Can. Bus. L.J. 80; G.H. Fridman, "Tendering
Problems" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 582; R.S. Nozick, Case Comment (1982) 60 Can. Bar Rev. 345;
N. Rafferty, "Mistaken Tenders: An Examination of the Recent Case Law" (1985) 23 Alta. L. Rev.
491; and J. Swan, Case Comment, (1981) 15 U.B.C.L. Rev. 447. See further S.M. Waddams, The
Law of Contracts, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1993), para. 159, 160, 394 [hereinafter
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consider the submissions and the substantive contract is awarded on that
basis. At this point the owner and successful bidder are obliged to enter
into contract B, the formal agreement. 6 In contrast, the law before Ron
Engineering regarded proceedings prior to the award of the contract as a
pre-contractual 7 phase of the tendering process. 8
The Supreme Court's judgment is essentially schematic and
makes little attempt to define the content of the transactional
framework. Instead, the elements of a workable system have gradually
taken form in a succession of lower court decisions. The exercise has
exposed the limitations of formal reasoning and underscored the need
for more potent doctrines. The intervening years have witnessed a move
from traditional rule-based analysis to open recognition of a
transcendent *standard of fairness. Although Ron Engineering was an
application of the former, the continued vitality of the two-contract
model has largely been attributable to the reception of the latter as an
overarching principle in the field of public tendering. This article will
examine these developments, assessing the implications of orthodox
contract reasoning and the impetus towards more expansive forms of
analysis.
The following issues will be considered. First, the integrity of
contract A hinges upon an enforceable duty to award the tender in
accordance with conditions prescribed in the bid call. However, tender

Contracts].
6 This analysis has been extended to the relationship between contractor and sub-contractor:
Peddlesden Ltd. v. Liddell Construction Ltd. (1981), 32 B.C.L.R. 392 (S.C.); Gloge Heating &
Plumbing Ltd. v. Northern ConstructionCo. Ltd. (1986), 67 A.R. 150 (C.A.) [hereinafter Gloge]; and
Fred Welsh Ltd v. B.G.M. ConstructionLtd. (1996), 24 B.C.L.R. (3d) 52 (S.C.) [hereinafter Fred
Welsh].
7 The presence or absence of contract does not relieve an owner from alternative forms of
obligation, such as liability for negligent misstatement or misrepresentation. See, for example,
CardinalConstructionLtd. v. Brockville (City) (1984), 4 C.LR. 149 (Ont. H.C.J.) (misdescription of
utility installations in project drawings accompanying tender documents); Defence Construction
(1951) Ltd. v. MunicipalEnterprisesLtd. (1985), 71 N.S.R. (2d) 59 (C.A.) (failure to advise tenderers
of increase in statutory wage schedules); KR.M. Construction Ltd. v. British Columbia Railway
(1982), 40 B.C.L.R. 1 (C.A.) (presenting a substantial underestimate of the quantity of material to
be moved); and BG Checo InternationalLtd. v. British Columbia Hydro & PowerAuthority, [1993] 1
S.C.R. 12 (non-disclosure of conditions of work site).
8 See, for example, Calgary (City) v. Northern Construction Co. (1986), 67 A.R. 95 at 101
(C.A.), McDermid J.A., aff'd [1988] 1 S.C.R. 757 [hereinafter Northern Construction];Fred Welsh,
supra note 6 at 61, Romilly J.; and NortheastMarine Services Ltd. v. Atlantic PilotageAuthority, [1993]
1 F.C. 371 at 398 (T.D.) [hereinafter Northeast Marine T.D.], McNair J. The absence of
accountability in the tendering process prior to Ron Engineering is clearly illustrated in Sankey v.
Ministerof Transport, [1979] 1 F.C. 134 (T.D.).
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documents commonly contain a disclaimer 9 reserving the right to accept
or reject any bid. On a literal construction such provisions may
effectively negate any obligation by the owner, thereby undermining the
very basis of a binding agreement.10 The inevitable question is whether
the two-contract model can be sustained in these circumstances.1) Since
1981 courts have had to weigh the implications of this interpretation
against the binding authority of Ron Engineering. Their attempts to
reconcile principle and pragmatism will be assessed.
Secondly, if the disclaimer does not rob contract A of juristic
effect, the problem persists that an owner's obligations must be
understood in the context of an arrangement contemplating the exercise
of discretion. The two must necessarily be reconciled because
unchecked discretion is inconsistent with a binding legal process. In fact,
freedom of choice is illusory if the transaction is constrained by defined
expectations and standards of fairness. The resolution of these
perspectives goes to the heart of contract A, determining its essential
content as well as the form of liability engendered by its breach.
Thirdly, attention will be directed to the evolving role of fairness
and its relationship to traditional contract analysis. This leads to the
final consideration, namely, the influence of policy objectives in
fashioning the modem scheme of public tendering.
II. THE DISCLAIMER
A. The Problem in Context
Ron Engineering concerned the effect of mistake in the
submission of a tender and the status of the bid deposit. However the
broader discussion has left an enduring imprint on the contractual basis
of public tendering. Unfortunately the Supreme Court did not provide
any guidance as to the effect of an owner's disclaimer on the formation
9 Also commonly referred to as a "privilege clause." In this article both terms will be used
interchangeably.
10 This possibility remains after Ron Engineeringbecause the Supreme Court conceded that
the owner's obligation to accept the lowest tender was qualified by the terms of the bid call: supra
note 1 at 122-23.
11 As Romilly J. expressed the point in Fred Welsh, supra note 6 at 69: "This type of clause, not
uncommon in call-for-tender documents, could be interpreted to be in obvious contradiction to the
reasoning of Ron Engineering.... If such a clause were to be given its full effect on face value, it
could be capable of preventing the formation of the Contract A, as envisioned by the court in Ron
Engineering."
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of a preliminary contract. This was an opportunity foregone because the
tender documents in Ron Engineering contained a disclaimer in common
form stating: "The commission reserves the right to reject any or all
tenders ... and the lowest or any tender will not necessarily be

accepted." 12 Although the clause was mentioned in the appeal materials
it was not addressed in the Supreme Court's judgment. Thus the
decision is silent as to the degree to which an owner's obligations can be
modified by appropriate contractual terms.
Judicial responses have been varied. At one extreme there has
been a refusal to accept that the words mean what they say. In R. v.
CanamericanAuto Lease & Rental Ltd.13 the tender specifications stated:
"The Department will not necessarily accept the highest offer, nor will it
be bound to accept any tender submitted." 14 At first instance15 and on
appeal1 6 this was dismissed as a "boilerplate" clause, which, taken
literally, would allow the owner to choose between tenderers in a
completely arbitrary fashion.17 However, the trial judge conceded that
some effect should be given to the provision,18 essentially on the basis
that the owner's discretion was circumscribed by reasonableness, not
arbitrariness. This intermediate position is the most obvious option if
efficacy is to be given to the two-contract model. A disclaimer
conferring unlimited discretion is incompatible with the concept of a
binding agreement. At the same time, it may be neither fair nor realistic
to dismiss the provision out of hand, for there are circumstances where a
disclaimer serves a legitimate function in the process of bid selection.
12 See Swan, supra note 5 at 455.
13 [1987] 3 F.C. 144 (C.A.) [hereinafter Canamerican]. See also Kencor Holdings Ltd.v.

Saskatchewan (1992), 96 Sask. R. 171 at 174 (Q.B.) [hereinafter Kencor Holdings], Halvorson J.; and
Fred Welsh, supranote 6 at 69-70, Romilly J.
14 Canamerican,supra note 13 at 153.

15 (4 March 1985), Ottawa T-4780-76 (F.C.T.D.) at 21 [unreported] transcript.
16

Supra note 13 at 156-58, Heald J.A.

17

Although this may seem a restrictive approach, on the facts there was a valid interpretative

basis for limiting the disclaimer. In construing the documents as a whole it was apparent that the
owner had undertaken to be bound by a prescribed selection procedure. For example, the request

for tenders stated that "tenders will be awarded to qualified tenderers on the basis of the highest
offers to Transport Canada": ibid. at 151.
18 Reed J. commented that "the clause in question would enable the Department to choose as

between airport bids and system bids ... or to reject a bid which did not meet the confidence factor
(a bid which it was unreasonable to expect the tenderer to be able to pay), or indeed in some other
circumstances which do not now come to mind ...": supranote 15 at 21 transcript. This qualification

was not mentioned in the Court of Appeal's judgments although there was general agreement with
Reed J.'s approach.
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Contracts for major construction works are a case in point. Where the
dollar value of competing bids is fairly close, factors such as the
applicant's business record, financial stability, and capacity to perform,
may outweigh the economic benefit of accepting the lowest tender.
Accordingly a degree of flexibility in the decisionmaking process is
warranted in relation to considerations that have a direct bearing on
performance of the tendering contract.
Canamericancan be contrasted with decisions giving expression
to the principle that parties are generally free to enter into agreements
in their own terms. For example, in M.S.K FinancialServices Ltd. v.
Alberta,1 9 it was claimed that the owner had rejected the lowest tender
for a property management contract in favour of a higher bid submitted
by a party that failed to meet the prescribed eligibility criteria. The
Instructions to Bidders specified: "The lowest or any tender may not
necessarily be accepted and the Minister reserves the right to reject any
and all tenders." 20 The plaintiff, being the lowest bidder, argued that
contract A required the owner to enter into contract B with the plaintiff.
The court noted Estey J.'s remarks in Ron Engineeringas to the qualified
obligations of the owner and observed:
It is clear ... that if the owner accepts a bid both parties are obligated to enter into a

contract B. However, it does not necessarily follow that the owner is obliged to accept
any particular bid and enter into a contract B. Such an obligation on the part of an owner
would exist only if the terms of contract A required the owner to accept a particular bid.
...
In this case there was no obligation on the defendant to accept any bid. It had a right
to accept any particular bid, if it wished. The failure by the defendant to exercise that
right in regard to any particular bid does not give an unsuccessful bidder a cause of
action. 21

In some senses this draws Ron Engineering full circle. The
degree to which the owner is obliged to accept the lowest tender is, in
the words of Estey J., controlled by the terms and conditions established
in the call for tenders. Such terms may negate any binding obligations
and defeat the inference of a unilateral contract 2 2 Thus the model
19 (1987), 77 A.R. 362 (M.C.) [hereinafter M.S.K].
20

1bid. at 365.

21 Ibid. at 366-67, Master Funduk [emphasis omitted]. See also Elgin Construction Co. v.
Russell (Township) (1987), 24 C.L.R. 253 at 257 (Ont. H.C.J.) [hereinafter Elgin Construction],
White J.; and Martselos Services Ltd. v. Arctic College, [1994] N.W.T.R. 36 at 42-46 (C.A.)
[hereinafter Martselos Services], Vertes J.A., leave to appeal refused [1994] 3 S.C.R. viii.

22 The circuity of this reasoning is captured in the following passage: "[w]hen the respondent
[bidder] submitted its tender, that gave rise to Contract A. As noted in Ron Engineering,in addition
to the obligation to enter into Contract B on acceptance, the appellant [owner] had the qualified
obligation to accept the lowest tender but subject to the 'terms and conditions established in the call
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which the Supreme Court posits is in danger of collapsing in upon itself.
Or at least, so it would seem. However, the majority of post-Ron
Engineering decisions have upheld a preliminary contract despite the
inevitable presence of a disclaimer. The application of this clause has
been assailed from two directions: first, and perhaps most predictably, by
recourse to strict construction; 23 second, by prescribing a baseline of
fairness for the efficacy of contractual terms. The latter has a more
general application in regulating the tendering process and will be
addressed separately 24
B. Construction
A disclaimer serves to relieve the owner of binding obligations in
awarding the tendering contract. 2 5 If the clause is sustained in this form,
the bid call is effectively relegated to its former status as an invitation to
treat, leaving participants without redress for any perceived
improprieties. It is questionable whether this accords with the parties'
expectations in the modern tendering context, particularly when bidders
are required to prepare complex technical submissions and to lodge a
deposit to establish bona fides.26 In these circumstances, discretion
without accountability would create "an unacceptable discrepancy
between the law of contract and the confident assumptions of
commercial parties." 27

for tenders.' One of the explicit terms of the tender call in this case was that the lowest or any
tender would not necessarily be accepted": Martselos Services, supra note 21 at 43, Vertes J.A.
23 A strict interpretation bordering on a contra proferentem construction is consistent with
judicial treatment of limitation clauses generally.
24 See Part IV, below.
25 Recent cases illustrate that owners are increasingly attempting to achieve this end by

couching the disclaimer in more expansive language. See, for example, Kencor Holdings, supra note
13 at 172; Health CareDevelopers Inc. v. Newfoundland (1996), 141 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 34 at 40 (Nfld.
C.A.) [hereinafter Health Care Developers]; and Fred Welsh, supra note 6 at 71-72. There are also

indications that limitation clauses are being imposed by owners as a condition of tendering. See, for
example, B.A. Blacktop Kamloops v. British Columbia (Ministry of Transportationand Highways)

(1996), 24 B.C.L.R. (3d) 149 at 151-52 (S.C.).
26 See PrattContractorsLtd. v. Palmerston North City Council, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 469 at 479-80
(H.C.) [hereinafter Pratt Contractors],Gallen J.
27

Blackpool & Fylde Aero Club Ltd v. Blackpool Borough Council, [1990] 3 All E.R. 25 at 30
(C.A.) [hereinafter Blackpool], Bingham LJ.
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The matter can be addressed by ordinary rules of construction.
In essence, a party occupying a superior bargaining position 28 is
attempting to exclude or limit its legal obligations. 29 The assertion of
such rights is treated with circumspection and the initial point of
departure for this discussion is that privilege clauses will usually receive
a narrow interpretation. The following implications will be considered:
first, the award procedure specified in a request for tenders has been
interpreted as an undertaking by the owner to comply with that process.
The nature of the undertaking must be assessed in relation to a
disclaimer purporting to negate this obligation. Secondly, the award
process has been subject to challenge where the owner's decision was
influenced by undisclosed considerations. Whether such practices are
sanctioned by a privilege clause will be addressed from the perspective
of traditional formation analysis. Thirdly, it is commonly assumed that
privilege clauses must be interpreted restrictively in order to preserve
the two-contract model. The necessity for this stance will be assessed
against the neutral setting of New Zealand contract law, where the
parties are free to contract in their own terms without specific allegiance
to Ron Engineering'sprinciples.
1. Implied promise
There are two components to the standard disclaimer: the
negative right to reject bids and the positive right to award the contract
arbitrarily and without accountability. The negative form of the
disclaimer has proven effectual to the extent that courts have accepted
that an owner may reject all bids3O or alternatively, reject individual
28 The owner, as author of the tendering documents which embody the express terms of
contract A, is essentially placing potential bidders in a "take it or leave it" position. This is dictated
as much by the tendering process as the personal inclinations of the owner. The two-contract model
does not generally contemplate a bargaining exercise. Tenders for goods or services are invited on
the basis that the same terms and conditions apply to all participants. Indeed, the process has been
successfully challenged where the owner has departed from this principle.
29 This could perhaps be more aptly expressed in terms of preventing such obligations from
arising. In the context of contract A, a disclaimer does not exclude or limit an (existing) obligation
because the parties' relationship is governed by the terms and conditions of the contract. If it is
agreed that the owner will not assume certain obligations, the parties are merely precluding the
formation of such terms.
30

Best Cleaners& ContractorsLtd. v. Canada,[1985] 2 F.C. 293 at 306 (C.A.) [hereinafter Best
Cleaners], Mahoney J.A.; Martselos Services, supra note 21 at 42-44, Vertes J.A.; ChinookAggregates
Ltd v. Abbotsford (Municipal District) (1989), 40 B.C.L.R. (2d) 345 at 347 (C.A.), [hereinafter
ChinookAggregates], Legg J.A.; Pratt Contractors,supra note 26 at 487, Gallen J.; Murphy v. Alberton
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tenders which are non-conforming. 31 The former can be justified from a

practical perspective in that the invitation may fail to elicit any
satisfactory tenders and it would be unrealistic to compel an owner to

proceed with the transaction. The latter is nothing more than proper
administration of contract A: the requested act to form a contract,
namely submission of a conforming bid, has not been performed. By
definition it cannot be treated as an acceptance of the owner's offer.
Where, however, the owner elects to accept a particular bid, it

has generally been held that the disclaimer cannot sanction a significant
departure from the specified award procedure. Naturally, the greater

the specificity the more readily it can be inferred that the owner has
undertaken to evaluate bids on a particular basis.3 2 The primacy of this
undertaking is reinforced by the fact that a disclaimer is usually a
standard term of indeterminate application. 33 More particularly, the
former is context-specific, the latter is not.

This approach has founded liability in a variety of situations.
Most commonly the owner has been accountable for failing to award the
tendering contract to the lowest eligible bidder34 or for awarding a
contract materially different from contract B.3S Similarly, challenges
have been mounted where the owner applied undisclosed assessment
criteria 36 or accepted a non-conforming bid.37 The principles are aptly
illustrated by PrattContractors.38 At issue was a contract awarded by the

defendant council for the construction of road works. The bid call was
(Town) (1994), 114 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 34 at 43 (P.E.I.S.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Murphy], Jenkins J.; and
Power Agencies Co. v. Newfoundland Hospital & Nursing Home Association (1991), 90 Nfld. &
P.E.I.R. 64 at 69 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.), Cameron J.
31 Fred Welsh, supra note 6 at 69-70, Romilly J.; Vachon ConstructionLtd v. Cariboo (Regional
District) (1996), 24 B.C.L.R. (3d) 379 at 389 (C.A.) [hereinafter Vachon Construction], Finch J.A.;
and Murphy, supra note 30 at 43, Jenkins J.
32 Canamerican,supra note 13 at 157-58, Heald J.A.; Vachon Construction, ibid. at 389, Finch
J.A.; Pratt Contractors,supra note 26 at 479-480, Gallen J.; and Markholm Construction Co. Ltd. v.
Wellington City Council, [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 520 at 527 (H.C.) [hereinafter Markholm Construction],
Jeffries J.
33

The objection was voiced by Heald J.A. in Canamerican,supra note 13 at 158, that a specific
award procedure should not be subservient to a conflicting general provision of "uncertain
applicability."
34 Kencor Holdings, supra note 13; Chinook Aggregates, supra note 30; and Zutphen Bros.
ConstructionLtd. v. Nova Scotia (A. G.) (1993), 125 N.S.R. (2d) 34 (S.C.).
35 Best Cleaners,supra note 30.
36 ChinookAggregates, supranote 30; and Tercon ContractorsLtd v. British Columbia (1993), 9
C.L.R. (2d) 197 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter Tercon Contractors].
37

Vachon Construction,supra note 31.

38

Supra note 26.
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accompanied by detailed tendering guidelines and comprehensive
technical information. These materials indicated that tenders would be
assessed in two stages. Applicants were initially judged by certain
criteria, such as experience, physical resources and technical skill. Those
who met the required standard in each category would be considered in
relation to price. Although the tendering form proclaimed that the
owner was "not bound to accept the lowest or any tender he may
receive" 39 the owner undertook to enter into a contract with the eligible
tenderer offering the lowest price.
The plaintiff, a company that had offered the lowest price,
challenged the council's decision to award the contract to a competitor
which had submitted a non-conforming bid. Reviewing the evidence,
Gallen J. observed that the documents were extensive and detailed.
They prescribed precise methods for evaluating tenders and amounted
to a promise that the contract would be awarded to the lowest eligible
tenderer. The degree of particularity provided a context in which the
court could infer a binding commitment to act in a certain way. In turn,
bidders accepted this undertaking as a basis for expending time and
money in preparing submissions. The contractual nature of the
arrangement was underscored by the stipulation that only parties who
had registered their interest and paid a $100 non-refundable deposit
were eligible to bid. Cumulatively, the facts supported the two-contract
model and it was concluded that the council was in breach of the terms it
had itself imposed. As Gallen J. expressed the principle:
Once it [the Council] determined to accept a tender, then I think it was obliged to do so
on the basis on which it sought tenders. The plaintiff has therefore been the victim of a
breach of contract because once the Council purported to act within the tendering
framework, it was obliged, if it awarded a contract at all, to award it to the tenderer
submitting the lowest conforming tender. 40

Turning to the disclaimer, it was accepted that the owner was at liberty
to reject all bids. This was not, however, the option it chose. Council
instead elected to accept a particular bid. In the face of a specific award
procedure the negative form of the disclaimer could be countenanced,
the positive could not.

39
40

Ibid. at 481.
Ibid. at 487.
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2. Undisclosed terms
Although the precise scope and function of a disclaimer is
unsettled, there is consensus that such clauses cannot regularize or
sanction procedural impropriety.4 1
A common objection by
disappointed bidders is that the bid selection was governed by
undisclosed considerations which operated to the advantage of some,
but not others. Applying the principles established in Ron Engineering it
has been recognised that the parties' rights crystallize on the formation
of contract A. Undisclosed conditions cannot form part of that contract
and therefore fall outside the contemplation of the disclaimer. This was
most directly expressed in Chinook Aggregates,4 2 where the British
Columbia Court of Appeal forcefully denounced the owner's attempts to
apply an unstated policy of preferring local contractors whose tenders
were within ten per cent of the lowest bid. Delivering the judgment of
the court, Legg J.A. observed:
[W]here the appellant [owner] attaches a condition to its offer ... and that condition is
unknown to the respondent [bidder], the appellant cannot successfully contend that the
privilege clause made clear to the respondent bidder that it had entered into a contract

on the express terms of the wording of that clause. There was no consensus between the
parties that the wording of the privilege clause governed. 43

ChinookAggregates was cited with approval in NortheastMarine
Services Ltd. v. Atlantic PilotageAuthority,4 4 a case which similarly turned
on the application of a disclaimer to a decision based on undisclosed
criteria. In NortheastMarine the Federal Court of Appeal questioned
whether disclosure was necessary in every instance, and postulated two
distinct bases for assessing bids.
The salient facts were that the defendant authority advertised for
the provision of pilot boat services and the contract was ultimately
awarded to a party submitting a higher bid than the plaintiff, the lowest
qualified bidder. The defendant's decision was prompted by a concern
that in view of the plaintiffs other operations in the region, it would

41 Such conduct is sometimes regarded as transgressing basic expectations of fairness and

addressed on that footing. See discussion in Part IV, below.
42
Supra note 30.
43 Ibid. at 349. See similarly Fred Welsh, supra note 6 at 69, where it was observed that
arbitrary discretion under a privilege clause would negate consensus as to the terms of contract A.
44 [1995] 2 F.C. 132 at 160 (C.A.) [hereinafter NortheastMarine], Stone J.A. (dissenting). The

majority expressed general agreement with the reasons of Stone J.A. while differing as to his
conclusions on the evidence.
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effectively enjoy a monopoly if awarded the contract. This was not
mentioned in the bid particulars as a possible consideration in assessing
tenders. The defendant relied on a disclaimer reserving "the right to
reject any or all tenders or to accept any tender considered in its best
interest." 45 The Trial Division of the Federal Court 46 held that the
clause had no application where the owner purported to impose preconditions that were not revealed to the participating bidders. This
conduct breached an implied obligation under contract A to treat all
bidders fairly and accordingly the defendant was liable in damages. By a
majority the authority's appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal was
allowed.
Delivering the majority judgment, Letourneau J.A. drew a
distinction between a condition of the tendering process and a
consideration in assessing bids. If the monopoly issue had fallen under
the former category, the plaintiffs bid would have been rejected at the
outset. Instead, the tender was accepted, assessed on its merits and
identified as one of two final qualified bids. Factors such as the
possibility of a monopoly entered the picture at that later stage when
particular bids were evaluated. At this point the owner was exercising its
powers under the privilege clause to accept or reject any bid. The issue
of monopoly was a legitimate consideration, along with such matters as
safety, financial stability and conflict of interest. In developing this
argument it was necesary to address the established view that a
disclaimer can only apply to the express terms of contract A. 4 7 The
Court asserted that the right to inquire as to a possible monopoly was so
fundamental that it could reasonably be implied. There was no need to
specifically advise participants because the assumption could be drawn
that a public body would take such matters into account in the proper
discharge of its duties.
It is respectfully submitted that the rationalization of the
condition-consideration distinction is unconvincing. The Federal Court
of Appeal equated monopoly with other concerns fundamental to the
interests of contracting parties. Few would dispute that public bodies
should refrain from contracting with bidders whose practices are unsafe
or whose status gives rise to a conflict of interest. The observance of

45 Ibid. at 143.
46 NortheastMarine T.D., supra note 8.
47

Fred Welsh, supra note 6 at 69, Romilly J.; and ChinookAggregates, supra note 30 at 348-49,
Legg J.A.
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such standards is an obligation, not a mere discretion.4 8 However, the
possibility of a monopoly or conflict of interest is not so patent or
immediately discoverable as to enable an owner to summarily reject
submissions at the time of the bid opening. These objections would
more likely be identified at the evaluation stage, whereupon the relevant
tenders would be rejected. It is inappropriate to depict this as an
exercise of discretion for there is no real latitude to award contract B to
the bidders concerned. Therefore Northeast Marine confuses two
distinct functions occurring during the same phase of the tendering
process: the assessment of bids against discretionary criteria
(considerations) and identification and automatic rejection of
unacceptable bids, which contrary to the court's view, are conditions of
tendering.
Moreover, Northeast Marine expresses the conditionconsideration distinction in unduly constricted terms. The distinction
was seemingly driven by the perception that a privilege clause applies to
some criteria (considerations) and not others (conditions). It is unclear
why this should be so, for if an owner may reject bids on purely
discretionary grounds, then a fortiori a disclaimer can be invoked to
counter an impropriety or overriding public policy concern. In fact it is
questionable whether the disclaimer is strictly necessary because a
defective submission extinguishes any obligation to enter into a contract
with the affected bidder.
It has previously been noted that the majority judgment in
Northeast Marine is inconsistent with the general view that a disclaimer
can only govern the express terms of contract A. 4 9 To incorporate this
judgment into mainstream thinking it must be accepted that the power
to reject bids under the privilege clause is exercisable in respect of
matters so notorious that they need not be expressly declared. This may
be permissible in cases of obvious impropriety.5 0 However any broader

48 In the language of Letourneau J.A., this is a condition, not a consideration.
49 Compare with Chinook Aggregates, supra note 30, where it was held that an undisclosed
local bidder preference could not be sustained in the absence of prior disclosure. Northeast Marine
and Chinook Aggregates cannot be distinguished on the ground that the criteria in each were
materially different. If the avoidance of monopoly is a legitimate policy objective, then measures to
stimulate or protect a provincial economy should be viewed in the same light. In fact the issue is
beyond doubt in some jurisdictions which by statute have expressly declared that a local preference
policy operates in public sector tendering. See, for example, ProvincialPreferenceAct, R.S.N. 1990,
c. P-33.
50 For example, bribery or bid-rigging. Here the owner would not be strictly dependent on
express terms, including the disclaimer, to reject the bid because any resulting contract may be
invalid on public policy grounds. Proposals that fail to meet minimum safety requirements are in a
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application of this principle would run counter to present emphasis on
open competition, certainty of terms and accountability in the evaluation
of tenders. It would also encourage a quest for grounds that could be
proffered after the event as a legitimate basis for excluding certain
bids-a prospect that is philosophically unattractive and out of step with
current thinking.
3. A comparative perspective
In the post-Ron Engineeringera Canadian courts have tended to
de-emphasize the scope of a disclaimer as a perceived necessity in
upholding the two-contract model. The thrust of this thinking has
tended to divert inquiry as to whether a protective stance is strictly
necessary. Assessing the matter anew, the following question is posed:
what are the consequences of accepting that parties are free to contract
in their own terms? Does it inevitably follow that a freedom of contract
approach would place the two-contract model in jeopardy? The answer
can most usefully be explored from the perspective of a jurisdiction that
has applied the principles of Ron Engineeringwithout commitment to its
binding authority.

similar category although their rejection can be rationalised on ordinary principles of offer and
acceptance: the owner is not bargaining for unsafe goods or services. Bids can also be validly
rejected on grounds of monopoly, conflict of interest and financial soundness. The process must
however be explained on a different basis again. What is or is not a monopoly, for example, is
largely a question of degree, requiring careful and detailed assessment of not only the bid
submission but also extraneous factors such as market conditions, status of competitors and so on.
Usually this can only be undertaken at the evaluation stage of the tendering process. If such
concerns are foreseeable, it should be incumbent on the owner to advise of its intention to scrutinise
submissions on this basis. This would encourage participants to produce information to assist the
owner in making an appropriate determination. The disclaimer could ultimately be invoked in
rejecting a particular bid in the context of this open procedure.
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New Zealand courts5l have been receptive to the contractual
model espoused in Ron Engineering,52 while recognizing that parties are
at liberty to enter into different forms of arrangement or to negate this
scheme by appropriate language. Thus, on a freedom of contract
approach, the implications of a disclaimer have been squarely
confronted without any overriding allegiance to the two-contract model.
In Pratt Contractors53 the initial point of departure was that a
simple tender constitutes an invitation to treat and it was therefore
necessary to establish the contractual nature of the arrangement.5 4
Having found that the parties intended to create binding obligations on
the submission of a tender, the disclaimer was effectively subordinated
to the positive averment that the owner would enter into a contract with
the lowest eligible bidder.
A similar interpretative approach was evident in Gregory.S5
Here, the bid particulars did not contain any undertaking by the owner
to sell the subject property to the highest bidder. There was scant
51

Ron Engineeringhas not been readily adopted in other Commonwealth jurisdictions, which
continue to adhere to the traditional contractual approach. For the Australian position see J.W.
Carter & D.J. Harland, ContractLaw in Australia, 3d ed. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1996), para. 212;
and N. Seddon, Government Contracts (Leichhardt, N.S.W.: Federation, 1995), para. 6.5. Compare
para. 6.9 et seq., where the author postulates possible bases for imputing legal obligations in the
pre-award phase of tendering. For the English position see references cited supra note 2. English
law regards a request for tenders as an invitation to treat and not an offer. It has, however, been
recognised that a contractual obligation may be imposed on the invitor in exceptional
circumstances, as where there is an express undertaking to sell to the highest bidder. See Harvela
Investments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Company of Canada (C.L ) Ltd., [1986] 1 A.C. 207 (H.L.).
52
Markholm Construction,supra note 32 at 526; and Pratt Contractors,supra note 26 at 475 et
seq. Compare Gregory v. Rangitikei District Council, [1995] 2 N.Z.L.R. 208 at 220-22 (H.C.)
[hereinafter Gregory].
53

Supra note 26. For facts see text accompanying notes 38-40.

54 Gallen J. reiterated this view in the later decision of Maintec Ltd. v. PoriruaCity Council(19
October 1995), (N.Z.H.C.) [unreported] at 10 transcript:
The starting point I think is the general rule established in the nineteenth century that
the action of calling for tenders amounts to an invitation to treat and does not generally
give rise to any legal relationship between the parties. There is however, a line of
Canadian authority which accepts that in certain circumstances a contractual relationship
can arise in respect of the tender, leading to a second contractual relationship which
comes into being, if at all, when the tender is accepted. Such an analysis was accepted in
New Zealand in Markholm ConstructionCo. ... and I accepted it in the Pratt Contractors
case ... the question really is whether in the particular circumstances a Court is able to
conclude with confidence that the parties intended to create contractual relations in
respect of the tendering process, as distinct from the acceptance of the tender itself ....
See further Shivas v. BTR Nylex Holdings Ltd, [1997] 1 N.Z.L.R. 318 (H.C.), where this dictum
was cited and applied.
55

Supra note 52.
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information on the conditions of sale and a disclaimer was prominent on
the front and only page. In these circumstances it was held that the
disclaimer defeated the formation of a preliminary contract 5 6
Recognition of the two-contract scheme was essentially a matter of
construction: a preliminary contract would be countenanced insofar as it
was consistent with any disclaimer.5 7 Gregory departs markedly from
Canamerican,where the Federal Court of Appeal refused to accept that
an appropriately worded disclaimer could empower an owner to choose
in a completely arbitrary way between tenderers 5 8 In Gregory,
McGechan J. forcefully affirmed the parties' freedom to contract in their
own terms:
Parties at arm's length may contract in a way which allows the arbitrary, abnormal, or
even downright stupid. The disdain for the "arbitrary" is a valid interpretative approach,
in deriving intentions, but goes no further. If, to the contrary, the Canadian Court [in
Canamerican]intended to lay down some wider rule, I respectfully decline to follow.
There is no suggestion such is needed under commercial
conditions prevailing in New
59
Zealand, and freedom of contract should be allowed.

This suggests that the distinct focuses of Canadian and New
Zealand jurisprudence may be ultimately leading in different directions.
Canadian decisions have robustly resisted attempts to subvert contract
A. To that end there has been a discernible shift from formal analysis to
broader notions of fairness.60 In contrast, New Zealand courts have
tended to adhere more closely to the traditional contract paradigm. If
each continues on a parallel path, different regimes will emerge. 6 1
Classical contract theory nurtures rule-certainty and constrains the
exchanges of contracting parties within a set-piece of offer and
56 However the defendant council was found liable on the alternative grounds of negligence
and breach of s. 9 of the Fair TradingAct,1986, No. 121 (N.Z.).
57
The principle could also be stated in reverse, namely that a disclaimer will be effective to
the extent that it is consistent with the parties' general intention. For example, an express promise
by the owner may prevail over a general disclaimer see Canamerican,supra note 13 at 158.
58
Ibid. at 156-58.

59 Supra note 52 at 221. Nevertheless, McGechan J. accepted that the facts of Canamerican
disclosed substantial grounds for imputing a promise to award a contract on a certain basis. To that
end it was understandable that the Federal Court read down a general statement (the disclaimer) to
the opposite effect.
60 See discussion at Part IV, below.
61 On the assumption that parallels, by definition, never intersect. In fact the projection may
be too extreme in that New Zealand decisions contain isolated references to fairness in the
tendering context: Pratt Contractors,supra note 26 at 478, 481-83, Gallen J. What is however
unclear is whether the principle will be applied with equal vigour and attain a similar paramountcy
in this area of law.
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acceptance. In the case of public tendering, terms are largely dictated by
the owner, as author of the invitation to tender. If the parties are
deemed responsible for the outcomes of their agreement, then the dice
is loaded in favour of the owner. 62
The Canadian approach has moved more towards transactional
certainty, directed to bolstering the tendering scheme as a model of
mutually understood rights and obligations. 63 Indeed, at the urging of
Estey J., the protection of the tendering system has become a
proclaimed objective. Accordingly, conditions of the tendering contract
are sanctioned insofar as they are instrumental and not destructive of
that scheme. Where they tend to the latter, the balance is redressed by
traditional techniques of construction or the ad hoc intervention of an
overarching principle of fairness.
III. DISCRETION AND OBLIGATION
A. Overview
In the years since Ron Engineering the Supreme Court's model
has been buttressed by a growing expectation of probity in the pre-award
phase of the tendering process. The underlying principle has been
variously expressed as a standard of good faith, or a duty of fairness or
reasonableness. 64 For present purposes it will be assumed that in
whatever form the obligation is cast, the owner is subject to some
commonly acknowledged constraints. Two aspects will be considered.
First, the constraints arise in the exercise of what is ostensibly a
discretionary function. However, any notion of autonomy is illusory

62 This was starkly acknowledged in Blackpool, supra note 27 at 30, Bingham L.J., where the

Court of Appeal applied the traditional contract approach:
A tendering procedure ... is, in many respects, heavily weighted in favour of the invitor.
He can invite tenders from as many or as few parties as he chooses. He need not tell any
of them who else, or how many others, he has invited. The invitee may often ... be put to
considerable labour and expense in preparing a tender, ordinarily without recompense if

he is unsuccessful. The invitation to tender may itself, in a complex case ... involve time
and expense to prepare, but the invitor does not commit himself to proceed with the
project, whatever it is; he need not accept the highest tender; he need not accept any
tender; he need not give reasons to justify his acceptance or rejection of any tender
received.

63 See discussion of the court's role in balancing the respective interests of owner and bidder
in Part IV, below.
64 Ibid.
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because contract A-largely unhindered by the disclaimer 6 5-has
become a vehicle for enforceable expectations. One of those
expectations is that the substantive contract will be awarded on a certain
basis. Should this be understood as a mandate to accept the lowest bid?
If so, the process is little more than a procedural formality. On the other
hand, if the owner retains a vestige of active discretion, the scope of that
discretion will determine the nature of the owner's obligations under
contract A.
The second issue examines an implication of the first. Assuming
in a given case that the substantive contract is awarded in a manner
inconsistent with the owner's duties under contract A, does it necessarily
follow that a cause of action is bestowed on the disappointed bidder
offering the lowest eligible tender? If an impropriety in favouring bidder
X engenders liability to bidder Y, then some fundamental assumptions
are being drawn as to the owner's discretion and the enforceability of
obligations under a preliminary contract. Attention will be directed to
two recent decisions which have adopted conflicting positions.
The issues relevant to establishing liability have a corresponding
impact on the assessment of damages and in the final section this will be
explored in relation to remoteness and compensation for conjectural
losses.
B. Scope of Discretion
The owner's obligations under contract A are usually adduced
from the particulars of the bid call. Positive averments that the
successful tender will be awarded on a certain basis-most typically that
contract B will be offered to the lowest eligible bidder-are generally
enforced irrespective of the presence of a general disclaimer. 66 Suppose
the tender documents are silent on the point. If the transaction is a
simple sale of land or inventory, it can be confidently anticipated that
the highest bid will prevail. From the owner-vendor's perspective,
monetary return will usually be the sole consideration. It would be
perverse as well as improbable for an owner to frustrate its own interests
by awarding the tender on a different basis. In these circumstances the
65 Compare decisions such as M.S.K, supra note 19, which upheld the full measure of a
disclaimer in enforcing an owner's discretion.
66 As Heald J.A. expressed the principle in Canamerican,supra note 13 at 158: "[A] specific
award procedure rule should not be presumed to be subservient to a general rule of uncertain
applicability which contradicts the specific rule."

Obligationsin Public Tendering

1998]

absence of an explicit statement of the award procedure would be
unlikely to negate the objective expectations of the parties.
This approach has been extended to tenders contemplating a
continuing relationship between owner and successful bidder, such as
capital works projects67 or contracts for the provision of services. 68 Such
cases have propounded an obligation to accept the lowest bid as an
implied term of the preliminary contract. A similar outcome was
achieved by different means in Chinook Aggregates.6 9 The British
Columbia Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's finding that an
obligation to award contract B to the lowest qualified bidder was
imported into the tendering process 7Oas a result of custom or usage of
the construction industry.7 1 This approach has since been largely
discredited. Particularly where industry practice competes with a
disclaimer, courts have upheld the latter as an express term of the
contract. In Martselos Services 72 Vertes J.A., writing the leading
judgment of the Northwest Territories Court of Appeal, expressed the
point in uncompromising terms:
The respondent argues, however, that it was the industry practice or custom to award

these contracts in the past to the low bidder. ... Canadian jurisprudence, however, has not
recognized any precedence of industry practice or custom over the privilege clause, where
73
the privilege clause is an explicit term of a tender call, except in special circumstances.

In practice the distinction is more analytic than substantive. The
disclaimer is an express contractual term. Industry custom, by definition,
is not. Courts have rejected implied terms deriving from the latter.7 4
Yet there have been no similar qualms at treating expectations as to the
award procedure as an implied term simpliciter, enjoying paramountcy
over the same express condition (the disclaimer). The reason, it is
submitted, is that conventions of interpretation have been subordinated
to policy considerations. The lowest eligible bid criterion is seen as a
67 See Vachon Construction,supra note 31.
68

See Martselos Services, supra note 21.

69

Supra note 30.

70 The obligation prevailed over the standard disclaimer "the lowest or any tender will not
necessarily be accepted."
71 See similarly Kencor Holdings,supra note 13 at 173.
72

Supra note 21.

73

Ibid. at 43.

74 See ibid.; Elgin Construction, supra note 21 at 257, White J.; and Acme Building &
Construction Ltd. v. Newcastle (Town) (1992), 2 C.L.R. (2d) 308 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Acme],
leave to appeal refused [1993] 2 S.C.R. v.
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desirable facet of the tendering process. This is particularly so where the
owner is the Crown or a public body, for there is an expectation that
such parties will demonstrate fiscal responsibility in the conduct of
public tendering. The theme was sounded in early decisions such as
Wilfiid Nadeau Inc. v. R.,7Swhere Walsh J. remarked:
There is no doubt that a contract should normally be awarded to the lowest tenderer
unless there is reasonable justification for not doing so. This is a duty which is not owed
to the lowest tenderer, however, but to the public treasury which should never be called
upon to pay a higher price than is necessary without good reason. 76

The sentiment has been echoed in subsequent cases 77 and was recently
emphasised in Northeast Marine, where the Federal Court held that a
contract for pilot boat services was subject to an implied term to accept
the lowest qualified bidder because the owner was a Crown Corporation
with ultimate accountability to the Parliament of Canada.78

A note of caution is appropriate. The lowest eligible bid
criterion may be too simplistic for determining the award of complex
contracts, such as major construction works.79 Where bid prices are
fairly close, factors such as financial and technical competence, business
record and capacity to perform, may outweigh any benefit of accepting
the lowest tender.8 0 The point is well stated by Immanuel Goldsmith:
The purpose of the system is to provide competition, and thereby to reduce costs,
although it by no means follows that the lowest tender will necessarily result in the
cheapest job. Many a "low" bidder has found that his prices have been too low and has
ended up in financial difficulties, which have inevitably resulted in additional costs to the
owner, whose right to recover them from the defaulting contractor is usually academic. 81

75 [1977] 1 F.C. 541 (T.D.) [hereinafter Wilfrid Nadeau].
76

Ibid at 558.

77

Kencor Holdings, supra note 13 at 174, Halvorson J. (see passage reproduced in text
accompanying note 145); Tercon Contractors,supranote 36 at 206-07, Brenner J.
78 Supra note 8 at 413, McNair J. Reversed on other grounds: supra note 44; and Ken Toby
Ltd. v. British ColumbiaBuildings Corp. (1997), 34 B.C.L.R. (3d) 263 at 288-90 (S.C.), Burnyeat J.
79 For example in Health CareDevelopers,supra note 25, the decisionmaking process traversed
a range of technical, financial and political considerations. In this case the Newfoundland Court of
Appeal accepted that the owner had validly dismissed the lowest bid on the ground that its
construction proposals were not "functionally acceptable."
80 The list is not exhaustive. In Acme, supra note 74, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the
owner's right to invoke a disclaimer and award a project to the second lowest bidder that was in a
position to complete the work sooner and hire more local sub-contractors.
81 Supra note 2 at 19. See also Pratt Contractors,supra note 26, where intense competition
between bidders for a prestigious contract drove bid prices to levels that were only marginally
economic.
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Such concerns underscore the fact that while the broad language
of a privilege clause may potentially sanction irregular practices or
arbitrariness, there are a range of legitimate interests which can only be
safeguarded by an appropriate form of discretion.
C. Liabilityto Bidders
1. Remoteness
Although the submission of conforming bids will bring into
existence a series of separate preliminary contracts,8 2 for practical
purposes an owner's liability does not extend to each contracting party.83
If breach of contract A gives rise to a cause of action it must therefore be
asked: by whom and on what basis?
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that the
discretionary element of bid selection has largely been superseded by an
obligation to accept the lowest eligible tender. Failure to observe this
requirement must necessarily be actionable, or else contract A is
meaningless. This is essentially a "but for" argument. If the owner had
observed its obligations under contract A, the plaintiff would have been
awarded the tender. As a result damages are recoverable for losses
attributable to the breach. Yet how secure is this assumption? Does it
necessarily follow that in awarding the contract to a rival bidder the
owner has diverted a benefit from the plaintiff?84 This presupposes that
the owner would have proceeded in any event to award contract B to
one of the participating bidders and that on an objective view the

82

Ron Engineering,supra note 1 at 121-23; Martselos Services, supra note 21 at 43; and Health
Care Developers,supra note 25 at 46.
83 Breach of contract is actionable per sa However, the nature and probability of the loss is
relevant in assessing remoteness, to determine whether there is a compensable loss or merely an
entitiment to nominal damages. See generally Houweling Nurseries Ltd. v. Fisons Western Corp.
(1988), 49 D.L.R. (4th) 205 at 210-11 (B.C.C.A.), McLachlin J.A.
84 If the plaintiff is unable to establish the nature of the contractual benefit (its expectation

interest), damages may instead be recovered for reliance losses. These are alternative and not
cumulative heads of damages: Anglia Television Ltd. v. Reed, [19721 1 Q.B. 60 at 63-64 [hereinafter
Anglia Television], Lord Denning M.R.; CCC Films (London) Ltd. v. Impact QuadrantFilms Ltd.,
[1984] 3 All E.R. 298 at 305-06 (Q.B.D.), Hutchison J.; and Sunshine Vacation Villas Ltd. v.

Hudson's Bay Co. (1984), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 93 at 99-100 (B.C.C.A.) per curiam. As to the limits of
this election see Bowlay Logging Ltd. v. DontarLtd., [1978] 4 W.W.R. 105 (B.C.S.C.), aff'd (1982),

135 D.L.R. (3d) 179 (B.C.C.A.).
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plaintiff would have succeeded. 85 Whether it is realistic to impute this
outcome will depend on the particular facts.
For example, suppose two bids are received for the provision of
services to the owner. The first is very low, but invalid due to a defect in
form. The second, a valid bid, is very high and exceeds what the owner is
prepared to pay. If the owner wrongfully purports to accept the first bid,
does this entitle the second bidder to claim that by default it should have
been awarded the contract? In such circumstances there is a cogent
argument for giving effect to the disclaimer and assuming that an owner,
acting reasonably, 86 would have rejected the remaining tender.8 7 What
is being invoked here is the negative right to reject bids and it has been
suggested earlier8 8 that this aspect of the disclaimer has been more
readily enforced than the positive right to engage in an arbitrary bid
selection exercise. Two recent decisions have considered this negative
right in relation to an owner's liability to the lowest eligible bidder.
In MartselosServices89 the owner invited tenders for a janitorial
contract. The bid call contained a standard disclaimer. 90 In addition,
the owner, a college, was subject to government regulations and policies
which authorized the owner to refuse all tenders9) and specified that
contracts should only be awarded to "the tenderer who is responsive,
responsible and has submitted a tender lower than that submitted by any
other responsive and responsible tenderer." 9 2 Two tenders were
received. After the bids were opened but before the contract was
awarded, the plaintiff alleged that its competitor's (lower) bid should be
rejected. Essentially it was argued that a shareholder of the competing
company, who was also an employee of the defendant, had breached
85 In Health Care Developers,supra note 25, proceedings were brought by two disappointed
bidders, H and D. It was found that even if the owner had properly performed its obligations under
contract A, one of the bidders, D, would not have had a realistic prospect of being awarded contract
B. Therefore D was only awarded nominal damages.
86 However, there are limits to judicial indulgence to such arguments in favour of a party in
breach.
87 The counter argument is that there would be no remedy for the owner's breach. On
balance this may be preferable to compensating a party that would not have received a contractual
benefit if contract A had been properly performed.
88 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
89

Supra note 21.

90 The clause read "The lowest or any tender not necessarily accepted": ibid. at 39.
91 The Government ContractRegulations, N.W.T. Reg. 008-85, s. 14 (1) stated: "A contract
authority may refuse all tenders and award the contract to no one."
92 Ibid.s. 14(2).

1998]

Obligationsin Public Tendering

conflict of interest guidelines. After investigation, the college decided
that no conflict had arisen and awarded the contract to that party. The
plaintiff claimed damages for loss of profits resulting from breach of
contract A. The plaintiff succeeded at first instance on the ground that
the potential conflict of interest disqualified the competitor and the
services contract should therefore have been awarded to the plaintiff,
the only other eligible bidder.
A different stance was taken on appeal. Delivering the leading
judgment of the Northwest Territories Court of Appeal, Vertes J.A.
considered that the matter should be resolved by reference to the
statutory and contractual privilege clauses. The owner's obligations
under the tendering contract were governed by the terms of the bid call
and accordingly the disclaimer operated to negative any duty to award
the contract to the plaintiff. The submission that the court should
impute an appropriate course of conduct, with the next eligible bidder
succeeding by default, was therefore rejected. His Lordship concluded:
The issue here is what was the appellant obligated to do? Even if it had an obligation to
eliminate the competing bidder, it does not follow that there was any obligation ...
to

award the contract to the respondent. This does not change simply because the
respondent is the only eligible bidder. The appellant could have decided not to award
any contract. It is no different if the competing bidder is disqualified after awarding the
contract. The privilege clause, in these circumstances, is a complete answer to the
respondent's claim. 9 3

This may be contrasted with the later appellate decision of
Vachon Construction.94 In this case the owner permitted amendment of
the bid price after a tender had been opened. After deliberation, the
owner proceeded to award the tender to that bidder. The plaintiff, the
next lowest bidder, contested the award claiming that the successful
tender in its original form was invalid, and therefore the plaintiff should
have been awarded the contract. The owner argued that a disclaimer95
extinguished any obligation to award the contract to the plaintiff or any
other party. On the Martselos Services approach the clause would be "a
complete answer to the [plaintiffs] claim." 96 The British Columbia
Court of Appeal took a different view. The owner was in breach of a

93

Supra note 21 at 45-46 [emphasis omitted].

94

Supra note 31.

95

The provision read "The Owner reserves the right to accept or reject any or all offers": ibid.

at 382.
96

The full quotation is reproduced above at text accompanying note 93, supra.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 36 No. 2

duty of fairness to all tenderers,97 including of course, the plaintiff. Such
conduct could not be cured by a disclaimer. In this manner, Finch J.A.98
endeavoured to reconcile Vachon Constructionwith the earlier appellate
authority. His Lordship opined that if, as in Martselos Services, a bidder
has acted improperly, then the owner is not required to award contract B
to a rival bidder and accordingly effect can be given to a disclaimer.99
However, if, as in Vachon Construction, the owner has acted unfairly, it
would be inappropriate to allow that party to invoke a privilege clause to
sanction its own impropriety.
To this Finch J.A. added that, unlike Martselos Services, the
owner had given an advantage to the successful bidder.100 The
connection between the two points is not clear. In isolation this suggests
that the status of a privilege clause may be determined by reference to
the consequences of the owner's conduct-the conferring of a benefit.
This is a different proposition, with a different emphasis, from merely
holding that an owner's misconduct precludes it from invoking
contractual defences under the privilege clause.
Martselos Services and Vachon Construction are difficult to
reconcile unless it is recognized that each has a distinct focus. Vachon
Construction was circumspect in balancing the interests of owner and
bidders, with the acknowledged aim of maintaining the credibility of the
tendering process. Fairness was a central theme. The impropriety of
accepting an invalid bid precluded recourse to contractual defences and
triggered a duty to award contract B to the next eligible bidder. In
contrast, while Martselos Services does not treat contractual terms as
sacrosanct, the view emerges that express provisions cannot be readily
dislodged by an implied obligation of fairness. This orientation is
essentially a case of swimming against the tide, and the British Columbia
Court of Appeal's response in Vachon Construction suggests that
97

Fairness was also countenanced in Martselos Services but the court accepted the primacy of

contractual terms, including the disclaimer.
98 Williams J.A., in separate reasons, expressed agreement with Finch J.A., who delivered the
leading judgment.

99 It is questionable whether Mariselos Services can be rationalized as a case where misconduct
was solely atttributable to the successful bidder.

In both Martselos Services and Vachon

Construction,there was a period of deliberation and consultation by the owner after opening bids
and before awarding the substantive contract. If the bidder's conduct in Martselos Services was
improper, then the owner's informed decision to grant contract B to that party must be similarly
tainted:
100 The advantage in question being the opportunity to amend its bid in breach of the
conditions of tendering. Chinook Aggregates, supra note 30, was also said to be susceptible to this
analysis. In that case the advantage was an undisclosed preference for local bidders.
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construction analysis is destined to be marginalized in favour of more
purposive doctrines.
The decisions are instructive not only in illustrating the pivotal
role of fairness in fashioning the content of the parties' obligations but
also in demonstrating that the discretionary element of the tendering
exercise continues to present difficulties in determining liability for
breach of the preliminary contract and quantifying the resultant loss.
The latter issue now falls to be considered.
2. Damages for conjectural losses
To this point it has been established that discretion has largely
been subordinated to an obligation to award contract B to the lowest
eligible bidder. While this can be sustained as a general principle, its
application is often tempered by the practical uncertainties of the
tendering exercise. This is particularly evident when the remedial
implications are considered.
Where an owner is in breach of contract A, the court is
frequently drawn into a complex speculative exercise in assessing the
nature of the bidder's loss and the corresponding measure of
damages.10 1 If there are several comparable bids, a party wrongfully
excluded from consideration has at best lost the opportunity of a benefit
and is essentially claiming damages for loss of a chance. The attendant
uncertainty of the claim is particularly pronounced where tenders are
evaluated against non-monetary considerations and their relative merits
are largely a matter of subjective assessment. However, an obligation to
award contract B to the plaintiff does not have to be established as a
certainty, 102 for it has long been recognized that compensation may be
granted for a speculative loss.103 In a tendering context the anticipated
101 The mere fact that a loss cannot be quantified with certainty does not preclude an award
of damages: McRae v. Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1951), 84 C.L.R. 377 at 411-12 (Aust.
H.C.), Dixon and Fullagar JJ.
102 See NortheastMarine C.A., supranote 44 at 168-72, Stone J.A.; and Health CareDevelopers
supra note 25 at 59-60, Cameron J.A.
103 The classic authority for damages for loss of a chance, Chaplin v. Hicks, [1911] 2 K.B. 786,
has been approved in Canada: Wood v. Grand Valley Railway Co. (1914), 30 O.L.R. 44 at 49-51 (S.C.
(App. Div.)), Meredith CJ.O.; Toronto TransitCommission v.Aqua Taxi Ltd., [1957] O.W.N. 65 at
66-67 (H.C.J.), Gale J.; Webb & Knapp (Canada)Ltdv. Edmonton (City), [1970] S.C.R. 588 at 600,
Hall J.; Multi-Malls Inc. v. Tex-Mall PropertiesLtd. (1980), 28 O.R. (2d) 6 at 15 (H.C.J.), Craig J.
[hereinafter Multi-Malls]; and NortheastMarine C.A., supra note 44 at 170-72, Stone J.A. See also
discussion in S.M. Waddams, The Law of Damages (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1996), paras.
13.260-13.370 [hereinafter Damages]. A similar approach has been adopted in Australia: Poseidon
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profit for the substantive contract may be readily ascertainable because
calculations are usually made before bidding to determine the feasibility
of the contract and the attainable profit margin.1 04 The problem of
uncertainty arises in respect of a different facet of the transaction,
namely whether the plaintiff, as a disappointed bidder, would have been
awarded the tendering contract if there had been compliance with
contract A.105
In this regard it may be questioned whether recovery for loss of a
chance adequately reflects the fact that the contingencies on which the
chance depends are within the control of the party in breach. The
historical view is that damages should be assessed on the basis that
contractual duties would have been discharged in a manner that is least
burdensome to the defendant.l0 6 The vigour of this principle has
however been diminished by modern expectations of reasonableness as a
standard of contractual performance.1 07 Tendering cases in particular
have been receptive to this approach, emphasising the analogous
concepts of fairness and good faith. Such thinking is incompatible with
the traditional stricture that a party is not liable for failing to grant a
benefit it has no obligation to confer. The modern retort is that
obligations will be imputed to correspond with the parties' reasonable
expectations.
Nevertheless, the link between the owner's breach and the
bidder's loss is attenuated in a tendering context: the plaintiff is
effectively arguing that if the owner had observed the terms of contract
A, the plaintiff may have been awarded contract B, and as a result may
have been in a position to realise certain gains. This is illustrated in
Health Care Developers,108 where the provincial government invited
Ltd. v.Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994), 68 A.L.J.R. 313 at 319-20 (Aust. H.C.), Mason C.J., Dawson,
Toohey and Gaudron JJ. A comparable statement of the New Zealand position is found in Schilling
v. Kidd GarrettLtd., [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 243 at 248-51 (C.A.), Richmond P., and 269, Cooke J.
104 Moreover the owner will usually have accepted an alternative tender, which provides an
obvious yardstick for quantifying the disappointed bidder's loss. The loss in this context denotes
frustration of the plaintiff's ability to obtain the anticipated profit from the tendering contract.
105 Quantum is only relevant if causation has first been proven. From an evidential
perspective the two may overlap. In establishing that the plaintiff's loss is attributable to the
defendant's breach, the degree of chance (or probability) may be similarly relevant to valuation of
the contractual benefit.
106 Cockburn v.Alexander (1848), LJ. 18 C.P. 74 at 83, Maule J.; and Deverill v. Bumell (1873),
L.R. 8 C.P. 475 at 480-81, Bovill C.J.
10 7

Abrahams v. HerbertReiach Ltd., [1922] 1 K.B. 477; Bold v. Brough, Nicholson & Hall Ltd.,
[1963] 3 All E.R. 849 (Q.B.D.); and PaulaLee Ltd v. Robert Zehil & Co. Ltd., [1983] 2 All E.R. 390
(Q.B.D.).
108 Supra note 25.
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tenders for the construction of a hospital. The tender documents
provided little guidance on a number of key matters such as design
specifications, construction materials, and the general basis on which the
contract would be awarded. The documents contained a disclaimer and
the transaction was subject to the Public Tender Act,109 which authorized
the government to pass over the preferred bidder and award the contract
to another party if such a course was deemed expedient1 O Thus, the
criteria for selection and the subject matter of the contract were
uncertain and the decision making body enjoyed broad discretionary
powers.
The Newfoundland Court of Appeal found that the successful
tender should have been rejected. Although the owner was in breach of
contract A, there remained significant hurdles in establishing breach as a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs loss. For example, did it necessarily
follow that the owner would have proceeded in any event to award the
contract to one of the qualified bidders? And if so, was there a real
likelihood the plaintiff would have succeeded in these circumstances?
With respect to the former it was inferred that contract B would have
been awarded to one of the eligible bidders-a finding assisted in part by
the government's stated objective of stimulating construction activity. In
terms of the latter, it could not be determined conclusively that the
plaintiff would have been awarded the tendering contract if the
successful bidder had been excluded. The plaintiff had nevertheless
sustained the loss of a chance and was entitled, at a minimum, to a
portion of its lost profits divided by the number of qualified tenders.
However, having regard to the fact that either the plaintiff or a specific
rival bidder were the strongest contenders, damages were assessed on
the basis of one-half of the plaintiffs expected profits.
Although the court in Health Care Developers awarded damages
by reference to the disappointed bidder's anticipated profits,111 in more
extreme cases the contingent nature of the claim has resulted in relief

109 R.S.N. 1990, c. P-45.
110 Section 8 reads:
(1) Where tenders are invited in accordance with this Act and it appears to the
government funded body inviting the tender not to be expedient to award the contract to
the preferred bidder, the head of the government funded body shall report to and obtain
the authority of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council before rejecting the preferred
bidder or awarding the contract to a person other than the preferred bidder.
111 The principles for awarding damages in public tendering have attracted little discussion.
In most cases quantum has either been deferred for a separate hearing, agreed between the parties,
or determined at trial without further discussion on appeal.
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being confined to reliance interests only.112 Canamericanfalls into this
category. There the plaintiff was one of several successful bidders for
car rental concessions at certain Canadian airports. The gist of the claim
was not that the owner, Transport Canada, had failed to award contract
B to the plaintiff, but that a concession had been granted to one of its
competitors, in breach of the prescribed selection procedure. The
plaintiff claimed for losses attributable to the increase in business it
would have gained if its competitor had been eliminated. Alternatively,
the plaintiff sought to recover the extra amount it had tendered for the
purpose of outbidding its competitor. The Federal Court of Appeal
affirmed the judgment below awarding damages for the latter, and
holding that the claim for loss of profit was too remote.
Similarly, in Pratt Contractorsthe court resisted a claim for future
losses where it was argued that the tendering contract was a high profile
construction project that would have served as a stepping stone to
similar work.113 Damages were however awarded for loss of profits in
respect of the specific tendering project. The court's approach to the
latter is a striking example of the difficulties that can arise in assessing
the value of the contract to the plaintiff.
In its submissions the defendant council adduced seemingly
cogent evidence that the plaintiff would have been unable to realise a
profit and in fact would have sustained a significant loss on the project.
There had .been keen competition between bidders and profit margins
were reduced to a minimum. During the construction period there was
exceptionally wet weather. Flooding and associated problems made
performance of the contract more difficult and in turn, more costly. In
this regard the court had the benefit of evaluating the plaintiffs claim
against the actual performance of the contract by the successful bidder.
The latter had operated at a deficit. Nevertheless, Gallen J. declined to
hold that the plaintiff would have similarly failed to make a profit and
awarded $200,000 damages. It can be said that in circumstances such as
these, there is much to commend the more conservative option of
limiting recovery to reliance interests.
Canamerican and Pratt Contractors demonstrate the difficulties
of assessing the value of the substantive contract to a particular bidder.
Various techniques have been adopted in translating these uncertainties
112 In proceedings between general contractor and sub-contractor it has been suggested that
damages should be limited to bid preparation expenses unless the invitor has accepted the bid and
then refused to enter into contract B. See Bate Equipment Ltd. v. Ellis-Don Ltd. (1992), 132 A.R.
161 (Q.B.); and Fred Welsh, supranote 6.
113 Supra note 26 at 489.
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into an award of damages. Where there is no obvious superiority
between tenders, damages may be assessed on the basis that each had an
equal statistical chance of success. 114 If, however, it is possible to
identify a sub-class of stronger bids, the award may be calculated by
reference to the number of relevant submissions. In cases where precise
quantification is inappropriate or impossible there remains the broad

option of awarding a global sum without regard to statistical
opportunity. Alternatively, attempts at quantifying expectation interests
have sometimes been abandoned in favour of limiting compensation to
thrown away costs.1 15 Superficially at least these diverse generalized
approaches fall within the cynical principle that "[iln some contract
cases, damages for loss of a chance may represent a pragmatic response
to the uneconomic pursuit of truth in the definition of the plaintiff's true
expectation loss."116
However, this must be balanced against the fact that there is a

point beyond which judicial investigation is fruitless. The search for a
114 Such awards seem more in the nature of compensation for the value of an opportunity
than the worth of an unrealised contractual benefit.
115 Reliance claims by disappointed bidders fall into two categories: expenditures in preparing
for a submission and costs arising after the lodging of a bid. Claims in the former category are
pre-contractual, for contract A is only formed when a bid is submitted. Most tendering decisions
have readily countenanced reliance damages as an alternative to recovery of expectation interests,
although the pre-contractual aspect of the claim is seldom discussed. The status of pre-contractual
losses is not free from controversy. There are relatively few cases on point. Perhaps the best known
authority is Anglia Television, supra note 84, where the defendant, a leading actor, wrongfully
repudiated a contract to perform in a television play and was held liable for the plaintiffs wasted
expenditures before entering into the contract. The Court of Appeal expressed the view that these
costs were recoverable if they were reasonably in the parties' contemplation as likely to be wasted if
the contract was broken: ibid. at 64, Lord Denning M.R. This reasoning is open to the objection
that no commitment had been secured from the defendant at the time the expenses were incurred
and therefore the plaintiff had embarked on this course at its own risk. From this perspective it is
arguable that there is no causal connection between the loss, the formation of the contract or its
breach (see A.I. Ogus, "Damages for Pre-Contract Expenditure" (1972) 35 Mod. L. Rev. 423).
Waddams is critical of Anglia Television but sugggests that the result may be defensible on the basis
that as against a party in breach, it should be (rebuttably) presumed that the plaintiff's expenses
would have been met by income and therefore the outlay would have been recovered if the contract
had been performed: Damages, supra note 103, paras. 5.220, 5.230, cited with approval by the
Newfoundland Court of Appeal in Health Care Developers, supra note 25 at 61 (See further
Contracts,supra note 5, para. 707). In relation to public tendering it is submitted that a bidder who
is awarded, or has acquired the right to be awarded the tender in accordance with contract A, is
entitled to recover anticipatory expenses if the owner wrongfully fails to proceed. The bidder has
been prejudiced by a form of detrimental reliance, having incurred expenses in anticipation of what
has become an accrued right. This principle would necessarily exclude unsuccessful bidders who
may have incurred similar expenses in reliance of the same inducement.
116 M.G. Bridge, "Expectation Damages and Uncertain Future Losses" in J. Beatson & D.
Friedmann, eds., Good Faithand Faultin ContractLaw (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995) 438.
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precise measure of loss is often impossible in tendering cases and it is a
toss of the coin whether expectation losses should be quantified
impressionistically or whether the vista of compensation should be
reduced to the disappointed bidder's reliance interests. In some cases it
is possible to predict that on a balance of probabilities the plaintiff
should have been awarded the tendering contract. 117 This presupposes
an affirmative response to the questions posed earlier, viz. that if the
owner had observed the terms of contract A and reasonably exercised its
discretion, the plaintiff bidder would likely have been awarded contract
B and proceeded to realise its anticipated profit. Not uncommonly the
contingent nature of the claim is such that it may be more accurate to
class the expectancy as a chance of a benefit rather than the assurance of
a gain. The conservative option of limiting recovery to reliance losses
would often be to the owner's advantage. The economic reality of
tendering is that a bidder's expenses will usually be less than the reward
of the contract itself,118 and if the costs of tendering are minimal, the
owner's breach would be effectively without a sanction. Therefore the
inclination to award substantial as opposed to nominal damages for the
disappointed bidder's expectation interest,119 hints at a policy
initiative 120 of enforcing contractual compliance within the framework of
the two-contract model.

117 Occasionally the outcome can be asserted as a certainty. See, for example, Lanca
ContractingLtd. v. Brant (County) Boardof Education (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 414 (C.A.). The plaintiff
company submitted a tender for the construction of a school. Subsequently, at a meeting of the
board of education, the president of the plaintiff company was led to believe that the bid had been
accepted. The majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal held that a binding contract was formed
and the defendant board was liable in damages.
118 The Commonwealth v. Amann Aviation Ply. Ltd. (1991), 66 A.L.J.R. 123 (Aust. H.C.) is a
spectacular exception. The plaintiff successfully tendered for a contract to conduct aerial
surveillance on behalf of the defendant government. Subsequently the defendant wrongfully
terminated the contract, at which point the plaintiff had incurred significant expenditures in
preparing for performance. There were uncertainties as to the profitability of the contract, but the
plaintiff was able to recover approximately $5.5 million reliance losses.
119 Even if this means discounting the value of the contractual benefit to reflect attendant
uncertainties. At some point on this sliding scale a limit is reached below which only nominal
damages will be granted. Although tendering awards tend to fall within a 50-100 per cent band,
there is general authority for recovery based on lower probabilities. In Multi-Malls,supra note 103,
the chance of rezoning land was assessed at 20 per cent and damages for breach of a contract of sale
were discounted accordingly. See further D.H. Clark, "Loss of a Chance in (and by) the Supreme
Court of Canada" (1996) 75 Can. Bar Rev. 564.
120 See discussion in Part V, below.
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IV. AN OVERRIDING PRINCIPLE OF FAIRNESS
It has been observed121 that in the years following Ron
Engineeringlower courts have strived to maintain the essential principles
of the two-contract model against its perennial bete noire, the privilege
clause. The task has required some inventiveness because the Supreme
Court's contractual scheme was propounded in sparse terms. While
Estey J. speaks of protecting the integrity of the bidding system there is
little to suggest the form and scope of this protection. In fact the
sentiment is expressed more as a laudable objective than a paramount
doctrine.12 2 Even the key obligation to accept the lowest tender is
controlled by the conditions of the bid call12 3 and there is nothing to
suggest that this and other essential terms could not be varied
unilaterally in order to negate contractual obligations. Overall, the
impression emerges that a determined drafting exercise could dislodge
the model from its slender pedestal.
Judicial methodology in earlier decisions followed traditional
lines, defining the relationship of bidder and owner on ordinary
principles of construction. However, there is evidence of growing
receptiveness to more expansive doctrines. Increasingly, contractual
terms have been tested against a general principle of fairness. There are
obvious attractions to a free ranging approach disengaged from the
limitations of technical analysis, 124 and the standard has been readily
adopted as an implied term of contract A, or more broadly, as a general
duty under the tendering process.
The clarion was sounded in Best Cleaners,125 where Pratte J.
spoke of an implied term restraining the Crown from negotiating with a
particular bidder and changing conditions of the proposed contract.
Although such terms were not mentioned in the Supreme Court's
judgment, they could nevertheless be implied: "they simply impose on

121 See Part II, above.

122 The latter is thwarted by conceding the primacy of the general law of contract, and with it,
the parties' rights to bargain in their own terms.

123 Supra note 1 at 122-23.
124 Flexibility in determining the content of contractual obligations on a case by case basis is
evident in Fred Welsh, supra note 6. Romilly J. found, at 70, that the defendant owner had breached
its duty under contract A to treat all bidders fairly and the disclaimer was declared void in light of

the owner's "deceit, secret intent and unfair practices."
125 Supra note 30.
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the owner calling the tenders the obligation to treat all bidders fairly and
not to give any of them an unfair advantage over the others."12 6
In the intervening years fairness has become a common theme in
tendering cases 12 7 and its role is now uncontroversial. In its most

vigorous form, fairness is seen as an overarching principle which
transcends contractual terms.128 Although this is sometimes expressed as
a specific, such as equality of opportunity or a duty of disclosure,12 9 such
references are more illustrative than an intended limitation of the
principle.
In the law of tendering, fairness is commonly linked with good
faith130 and although the two are often referred to interchangeably,' 3)
126 Ibid. at 300. Pratte J.A. dissented in his view of the evidence and the appropriateness of
granting the Crown's application for a non-suit. Both Pratte and Mahoney JJ.A., writing the
majority judgment, followed Ron Engineering'sanalysis of the contractual relationship between the
parties. In the context of this relationship Mahoney J.A. briefly adverted to a requirement of good
faith: Best Cleaners,supra note 30 at 307.
127 See, for example, ChinookAggregates, supra note 30 at 350, Legg J.A.; G. Mallin Electric
Kencor
Ltd v. Westland ConstructionLtd., [1996] 112 Man. R. (2d) 131 at 133 (Q.B.), De Graves J.;
Holdings, supranote 13 at 173-74, Halvorson J.; Vachon Construction,supra note 31 at 386-87, Finch
J.A.; Northeast Marine C.A., supra note 44 at 150-51, Stone J.A.; and Health Care Developers, supra
note 25 at 46-47, Cameron J.A.
128 See, for example, Vachon Construction,supra note 31 at 386-87; Chinook Aggregates, supra
note 30 at 348-50; Northeast Marine CA., supra note 44 at 150-51; and Fred Welsh, supra note 6 at
70,73, Romilly J.
129 Chinook Aggregates, supra note 30 at 350; Fred Welsh, supra note 6 at 66; Best Cleaners,
supra note 30 at 300, Pratte J.A.; and Vachon Construction,supra note 31 at 389, Finch J.A., 389-90,
Williams J.A.
130 See Martselos Services, supra note 21 at 41-42; Health CareDevelopers, supranote 25 at 4647; Northeast Marine C.A., supra note 44 at 150-51; and Opron Construction Co. v.Alberta (1994),
151 A.R. 241 (Q.B.) [hereinafter Opron Construction]. An examination of the good faith principle is
beyond the scope of this article. Good faith has varied applications both within the panoply of
contract law and beyond. It has been imposed in pre-contractual dealings (most typically as a duty
to bargain in good faith) and subsequently as a standard of contractual performance. There are
differing perceptions of the good faith principle within the Commonwealth. English decisions have
been reticent in adopting this standard: Walford v. Miles, [1992] 1 All E.R. 453 (H.L.), a case
concerning an agreement to negotiate (criticized in E. McKendrick, "The Regulation of Long.term
Contracts in English Law" in Beatson & Friedman, eds., supra note 116 at 319-21). Compare with
the more expansive observations of Bingham L.J. regarding the role of good faith and fairness in
contract law in Interfoto PictureLibrary Ltd. v. Stiletto Visual ProgrammesLtd., [1989] 1 Q.B. 433 at
439-45 (C.A.). The doctrine has yet to gain a secure footing in Australia: Service Station Association
Ltd. v. Berg Bennett & Associates Pty. Ltd. (1993), 117 A.L.R. 393 (Aust. F.C. (Gen. Div.))
[hereinafter Service Station Association], although the judicial climate appears receptive to such
developments: Renard Constructions (ME) Pty. Ltd. v. Minister for Public Works (1992), 26
N.S.W.L.R. 234 (C.A.) [hereinafter RenardConstructions]; and HughesAircraft Systems International
v. AirservicesAustralia (1997), 146 A.L.R. 1 (Aust. F.C. (Gen. Div.)). The latter view has been
questioned by Sir Anthony Mason, "Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law" (1996) 11 J.Cont. L. 89
at 89-90. In New Zealand good faith has been described as a latent premise of the law relating to
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the latter is generally regarded as more restrictive. 132 Good faith is
essentially proscriptive, taking form as a negative interdiction.13 3 As
Kelly J. expressed the point in Gateway: "The law requires that parties to

a contract exercise their rights under that agreement honestly, fairly and
in good faith. This standard is breached when a party acts in a bad faith
manner in the performance of its rights and obligations under the
contract."1 34 Put concisely in the context of tendering, it has been said:

formation and performance of contract (Livingstone v. Roskilly, [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 230 at 237-38
(H.C.), Thomas J.), while obligations of reasonableness and mutual cooperation have been
propounded as an implied term of certain agreements: Devonport Borough Council v. Robbins,
[1979] 1 N.Z.L.R. 1 at 22-24 (C.A.), Cooke and Quilliam JJ., 28-30, Richardson J. Although the
matter is not entirely free from controversy, Canadian case law has openly countenanced a standard
of good faith in contractual performance: Greenberg v. Meffert (1985), 50 O.R. (2d) 755 (C.A.);
Health Care Developers,supra note 25; Gateway Realty Ltd. v. Arlon Holdings Ltd (1991), 106 N.S.R.
(2d) 180 (S.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Gateway], affd (1992), 112 N.S.R. (2d) 180 (S.C.A.D.); and Mesa
OperatingLtd. v. Amoco Canada Resources Ltd. (1992), 129 A.R. 177 (Q.B.), aff'd (1994), 19 Alta.
L.R. (3d) 38 (C.A.). The reservations expressed by Kerans J.A. on behalf of the Court of Appeal
indicate the unsettled status of this principle: Opron Construction. Compare with the divergent
opinions as to a duty to bargain in good faith in Empress Towers Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1990),
50 B.C.L.R. (2d) 126 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) vii (S.C.C.). See
further J.Cassels, "Good Faith in Contract Bargaining: Principles and Recent Developments"
(1993) 15 Adv. Q. 56. In the United States good faith is explicitly recognized as a general principle
of contract law: The Restatement of the Law, Second: Contracts2d (St. Paul, Minn.: American Law
Institute, 1981), § 205; Uniform Commercial Code § 1-203 (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1972). See S.J.
Burton, "Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith" (1980) 94
Harv. L. Rev. 369, which explores the good faith doctrine in relation to the abuse of discretion in
contractual performance.
131 See M.G. Bridge, "Does Anglo-Canadian Contract Law Need a Doctrine of Good Faith?".
(1984) 9 Can. Bus. LJ.385 at 387.
132 This is of course an oversimplification in the context of the wider operation of the good
faith doctrine. Adopting Professor Finn's thesis, good faith lies between the primary duties
associated with an unconscionability standard and the selfless obligations of a fiduciary to act for the
benefit of another (see P.D. Finn, "The Fiduciary Principle" in T.G. Youdan, ed., Equity, Fiduciaries
and Trusts (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) c. 1). In a terrain without boundaries good faith imparts
characteristics of each, with proscriptive standards dominating-without excluding-prescriptive
duties.
133 In some circumstances a positive duty may also arise under the good faith standard as an
expression of the principle that good faith requires each party to have regard to the other's interests
and inhibits their respective rights to act self-interestedly. For a more detailed analysis, see Finn,
supranote 132.
134 Supra note 130 at 191-92. In GATX Corp. v. Hawker Siddeley Canada Inc. (1996), 27
B.L.R. (2d) 251 (Ont. Ct. (Gen Div.)) at 276, Blair J. asserted that the good faith doctrine of
contractual performance is part of the law of Ontario. See also Ontario Law Reform Commission,
Report on Amendment of the Law of Contract (Toronto: The Commission, 1987) at 175.
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"As to the standard of conduct demanded by good faith, at a minimum,
it would require that a party not act in bad faith."135
Good faith, or perhaps more accurately, the restraint of bad
faith, is less exacting but more precisely understood than fairness. The
latter, a broader and more amorphous concept, has the obvious allure of
flexibility for achieving justice inter partes. Perhaps for this reason
tendering cases have relied more heavily on fairness to define an
appropriate measure of conduct. In its application there are indications
that the content of fairness may be fashioned by the parties' reasonable
expectations.13 6 If fairness is gauged by this standard it is necessary to
come to terms with a seemingly open-ended question. What, in a given
situation, are their reasonable expectations?13 7 In some senses this is a
tautology because what the parties expect is to be treated fairly.
However, the problem is narrower than first appears because fairness
has been judicially circumscribed in the context of public tendering.
Although the categories are not closed, most cases reflect defined
expectations of the owner's conduct under contract A: to disclose any
preference or criterion that may affect selection, 138 to accept only
conforming bids,139 and to refrain from awarding a form of contract that

135 HealthCare Developers, supranote 25 at 50, Cameron J.A. For a comparative discussion of
good faith in contract law, see Priestley J.A. in Renard Constructions,supra note 130 at 263-68. Of
particular relevance is his Honour's endorsement of the views of Professor Summers (R.S.
Summers, "'Good Faith' in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform
CommericalCode" (1968) 54 Va. L. Rev. 195):
In his view, the expression "good faith" as commonly (and sometimes vaguely) used by
judges is best understood as an "excluder"; that is, it "has no general meaning or
meanings of its own, but ...serves to exclude many heterogenous forms of bad faith". ... I
think Summers was quite accurate when he said "... the typical judge who uses this
prhrase is primarily concerned with ruling out specific conduct, and only secondarily, or
not at all, with formulating the positive content of a standard."
See Renard Constructions,supra note 130 at 266-67. See further Gummow J. in Service Station
Association,supra note 130 at 401-07.
136 Fred Welsh, supra note 6 at 66. It has been argued that reasonable expectations should
properly be treated as an adjunct of good faith. See G. Henley, "Significant Developments in the
Canadian Law of Tenders" (1991) 18 Can. Bus. L.J. 382; and S.K. O'Byrne, "Good Faith in
Contractual Performance: Recent Developments" (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 70.
137 Although the role of custom and usage has not been viewed consistently in a tendering
context, the reasonableness of a given expectation is sometimes measured against long standing
industry practice. See, for example, ChinookAggregates,supranote 30 at 350-51. However the role
of trade custom as an interpretative aid is necessarily limited. The beliefs of the contracting parties
are usually more germane than generalized inferences from unrelated transactions.
138
ChinookAggregates,supra note 30.
139

Vachon Construction,supra note 31.
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is materially different from contract B.140 In these situations any
defence based on a privilege clause has been resisted and the dictates of
fairness asserted as an overriding principle. Indeed, its primacy has been
identified as an essential element in preserving the integrity of the
tendering process.14 1
It is trite that the enforcement of fairness in its different
manifestations is viable only so long as such rights cannot be bargained
away. Perhaps surprisingly, freedom of contract retains a vestigial
influence here, fostering isolated suggestions that parties can contract
out of this obligation. Shannon 0' Byrne 1 42 argues that in limited
circumstances an "unreasonableness" clause negating good faith may be
enforceable providing it is "precise, specific, not antithetical to the entire
purpose or intent of the remainder of the contract, and is not
unconscionable or contrary to public policy." 143 In a tendering context
this revives the debate as to the paramountcy of the Supreme Court's
contractual model. A number of decisions have defended its principles
by subordinating the disclaimer to an objective expectation of fairness.
In Health Care Developers, however, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal
accepted that within the constraints of 0' Byrne's proposition, the
participants were at liberty to contract out of fairness or good faith.144
While this view may be sustained in limited or perhaps extraordinary
situations, it is submitted that public tendering will likely prove an
inhospitable setting for its widespread application. The bidding exercise
is often costly and time consuming. It is simply not feasible for the
owner-bidder relationship to be governed by a form of contract that fails
to vindicate expectations of fairness. The appropriation of arbitrary
powers would profoundly undermine confidence in the system and
The concern was expressed
ultimately prove self-defeating.1 45
graphically by Halvorson J. in KencorHoldings:

140 Best Cleaners,supra note 30.
141 NortheastMarine CA., supranote 44 at 151, Stone J.A.
142

Supra note 136.

143 Ibid. at 96.
144 Supra note 25 at 51. These comments were however obiter. On the facts the owner

conceded that there was no clause specifically reserving the right to treat bidders unfairly.
145 As Romilly J. noted in Fred Welsh, supra note 6 at 66:
General contractors, or sub-contractors ... are concerned that favouritism not be shown

other tenderers and that arbitrary or capricious decisions not be made. Those submitting
tenders are willing to accept some risk and bear the cost of preparing an unsuccessful bid,

provided the "rules of the game" are clearly spelled out and define what actually
happens.
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To maintain the integrity of the tendering process it is imperative that the low, qualified
bidder succeed. This is especially true in the public sector. If governments meddle in the
process and deviate from the industry custom of accepting the low bid, competition will
wane. The inevitable consequence will be higher costs to the taxpayer. Moreover, when
governments, for reasons of patronage or otherwise, apply criteria unknown to the
bidders, great injustice follows. Bidders, doomed in advance by secret standards, will
waste large sums preparing futile bids. 46

Further, an "unreasonableness" clause is philosophically
untenable in public sector tendering. Where the owner is the Crown or

a public body, there is an expectation of what may broadly be termed
"contractual probity." 147 This is manifested as a private law duty148
embracing expectations of procedural fairness as well as reasonableness
in exercising discretionary functions. This is supplemented by a mandate
to observe fiscal responsibility in safeguarding the public purse. 49
Notably in Health Care Developers the court specifically left open the
question whether, "for reasons of policy the Crown should not be
permitted to contract out of the good faith doctrine."150 The sentiment
could, of course, equally apply to all forms of contract because the
suppression of basic expectations of fairness is offensive both as a
bargaining objective and a proposed mode of contractual
performance. 151

146

Supra note 13 at 174.

147 Notions of fairness and good faith are of course relevant to contracts generally. The point
here is that the philosophical and moral imperatives are more obviously pronounced in relation to
the Crown as a contracting party. For further discussion see S.K. O'Byrne, "Public Power and
Private Obligation: An Analysis of the Government Contract" (1992) 14 Dalhousie L.J. 485. See
also P. Finn & K.J. Smith, "The Citizen, the Government and 'Reasonable Expectations.' (1992) 66
Aus. L.J. 139, which explores the proposition that the State should act as a moral exemplar in its
dealings with the community.
148 The private law duty is sometimes enforceable by a public law remedy such as certiorari.
See Thomas C.Assaly Corp. v. Canada(1990), 34 F.T.R. 156 (F.C.T.D.).
149 See comments of Walsh J. in Wifid Nadeau, supra note 75 at 558, reproduced in text at
note 76.
150
Supra note 25 at 51. See also the observations of Denault J. in Glenview Corp. v. Canada
(Ministerof Public Works) (1990), 34 F.T.R. 292 at 296 (F.C.T.D.).
151 Steven Burton and Eric Andersen question whether the resultant relationship can be
characterised as contractual. The authors suggest that a disclaimer of good faith is tantamount to
the denial of an obligation to keep one's word. Logically, it is a contradiction to make a promise
while denying any obligation to keep it. The enforcement of such provisions would effectively be
licensing a form of promissory fraud: S.J. Burton & E.G. Andersen, Contractual Good Faith
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1995), para. 3.2.5.
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V. DOCTRINE OR POLICY?
In Ron Engineering Estey J. spoke of preserving the integrity of
the bidding system. The phrase has been reiterated in a host of
decisions but there has been little discussion of its application or
underlying intent in the continuum of public tendering. Has the phrase
prompted a practical exercise of judicial stewardship or are the courts
merely displaying deference to a formless theme, an ideal without
content? The matter can be addressed by asking two basic questions:
what do the words mean and what are the dynamics of their
implementation? The latter prompts inquiry as to whether the integrity
of the bidding system is synonymous with preservation of the Supreme
Court's two-contract model. At first blush the answer-implicit in most
decisions-is yes. It will be argued, however, that recent cases are
explicable on a different basis, reflecting the dictates of a broader policy
objective.
Addressing the first point, it may be suggested that the integrity
of the tendering process is essentially directed to ensuring the continuity
of an effective system: at bottom, a system that works. This can only be
achieved if expectations15 2 of a predictable and orderly procedure are
maintained.153 This has found expression in different ways-for
example, as an endorsement of industry practice that bids from subcontractors remain irrevocable for the same period as the general
contractor's tender to the ownerj 54 Similarly, the general contractor is
entitled to rely on telephone quotes from sub-contractors when it is
understood that this information will be included in the general
contractor's tender.155 More generally, it has been held that confidence
152 This has been rationalized as "an attempt by the courts to reconcile the reasonable
expectations of all parties within the context of acceptable commercial standards and practice": Fred
Welsh, supra note 6 at 66, Romilly J.
153 A narrower aspect of this policy objective is demonstrated by the Supreme Court's
pronouncement on the law of mistake. By imposing a contractual nexus between owner and bidder
upon the submission of a conforming tender, the bidder is effectively prevented from withdrawing
due to an error in the bid price (compare the law prior to Ron Engineering:Belle River Community
Arena Inc. v. WJ.C. Kaufmann Co. Ltd. (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 447 (C.A.)). In balancing the parties'
interests it may be conjectured that notwithstanding the apparent harshness of allowing one party to
profit from an innocent error, the court was attempting to enforce an orderly process by preventing
bidders from reneging on their promises after tenders are lodged.
154 Gloge, supra note 6. Irving J.A., speaking for the Alberta Court of Appeal, observed at
153: "This industry practice is eminent common sense. Without such accepted practice the

tendering system would become unenforceable and meaningless."
15 5

A.W. MacPhailLtd v. Kelson (1989), 96 N.B.R. (2d) 330 (C.A.).
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in the system requires that contract B should usually be awarded to the
lowest qualified bidder.156 Again, there is increasing recognition that
dealings between owner and bidder are subject to an implied duty of
fairness. 1S7 The obverse of this proposition is that courts lean against
the assertion of arbitrary rights on the ground that absence of
accountability would severely undermine an effective system of
tendering.S 8
Maintenance of a scheme that commands the confidence of all
participants requires a deft balancing of interests. The dynamics were
expressly acknowledged in Fred Welsh, a decision that affords an insight
into judicial governance of the tendering system. Here, the integrity of
the bidding process was characterized in terms of preserving an
equilibrium between reasonable, but competing, expectations.
Commenting on the function of a privilege clause, Romilly J. opined that
if full effect was given to the provision, "the delicate balance of power in
the bidding process would clearly tip in the invitor's favour to the
bidder's detriment."lS9 In the same spirit, his Lordship acknowledged
that there was a quidpro quo for forfeiting absolute discretion under the
disclaimer, namely the ability to attract quality, competitive bids.160
This leads to the second issue. If courts are concerned primarily
with maintaining the viability of a system, it must be asked whether Ron
Engineering's model is the essential and only means of achieving that
end. To put the decision in context, there is no doubt that the
156 See Part III(B), above. This principle has been applied not only to penalise owners for
awarding contract B to a higher bidder, but also to sanction the acceptance of the lowest eligible
tender even where the bidder has made an error in calculating the bid price. For example, in
Northern Construction, supra note 8, a clerical mistake by the defendant contractor resulted in a
substantial underestimate in its tender. The owner refused to allow the bid to be corrected and
awarded the contract to the defendant. The defendant refused to execute contract B and the owner
proceeded to accept the next lowest tender. On facts similar to Ron Engineeringthe Alberta Court
of Appeal upheld the owner's right to sue for the difference between the two bids. On the question
of damages, the defendant argued that the owner should have mitigated its loss by accepting the
defendant's amended offer-the amount of its original tender as submitted, plus the additional sum
by which it had underestimated the bid. The court gave short shrift to this submission, expressing
the concern that this would change the tendering system to an auction. Clearly the court was averse
to compelling an owner to contract with a party in breach; moreover, the defendant's proposal
would have legitimated bid negotiation after the fact.
157 See, for example, NortheastMarine C.A., supra note 44 at 151, where Stone J.A. describes
this as a "judicially imposed obligation whose purpose and object is to preserve the integrity of the
tendering process."
158

KencorHoldings,supra note 13 at 174, Halvorson J.

159 Fred Welsh, supra note 6 at 69.
160

Ibid. at 66.
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contractual regime and the philosophy which informs it, has transformed
the tendering process. The preliminary contract provides a framework
of express obligations and the opportunity to import terms consistent
with its effective administration. It is reinforced by some key concepts,
but the principle of fairness-so recurrent in modem decisions-is not
mentioned in the Supreme Court's judgment. This is not altogether
surprising because the case is an exposition of traditional contract
analysis. Doctrinal adherence to Ron Engineering is synonymous with
orthodox rule-based reasoning, which begs the question whether formal
analysis is sufficiently pliant to fulfil the policy objectives of public
tendering. The challenge should not be understated. The conditions of
public tendering are essentially the product of a standard agreement. Of
necessity, tendering contemplates that common terms will apply to all
bidders and that there is little or no room for individual negotiation.
The result is that the owner, as author of the bid particulars, dictates
terms and does so in a manner favourable to itself. It has been observed
that such agreements
undercut the jurisprudential basis for many rules of traditional contract law. Those rules

presuppose a contracting environment characterized by negotiative interplay of
conflicting interests. ... When, as in standardized contracting, unilateralness replaces

negotiation and abstract generality precludes bilateral realization of interests, these
161
traditional doctrines no longer serve that end.

The armoury of traditional remedies is directed more to the nonfulfilment of contractual obligations, lack of consensus or capacity, than
redressing an inherent imbalance between the contracting parties.16 2
Some early decisions in the post-Ron Engineering era adhered to
contractual orthodoxy in general, and formation analysis in particular.
Their interpretations were often strained as they combatted privilege
clauses with little more than a narrow construction and an unspoken
reluctance to sanction the conferring of self-imposed immunities.
It has been suggested 6 3 that modern authorities have gravitated
towards extra-contractual rules of conduct16 4 as a basis of enforceable
expectations. Increasingly, the adjudicative process is a blend of formal

161 R. Dugan, "Good Faith and the Enforceability of Standardized Terms" (1980) 22 Win. &
Mary L. Rev. 1 at 5.
162 In extreme cases unconscionability may operate as a restraint on an inappropriate exercise

of contractual power.
163 See particularly Part IV, above.

164 The term "extra-contractual" may be a misnomer insofar as the rules are defined as
implied terms.
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reasoning undergirded by fairness and good faith.16S The latter affords
open recognition of a higher ideal: that the system must function and
that the law should harmonize the parties' rights based on their
reasonable expectations.16 6 Thus, it has been held that the purported
acceptance of an invalid bid cannot give rise to a contractual
relationship; by the same token this conduct could be impugned for
breaching a duty of fairness to other bidders.167 Similarly, contract B
can only be awarded in accordance with the terms of contract A and it
would be unfair to invoke a privilege clause to legitimize a departure
from that principle.168 Again, the adoption of undisclosed preference
criteria defeated consensus as to the subject matter of the disclaimer and
constituted a breach of fairness to competing bidders.69 Finally, a
general contractor's failure to enter into contract B with a subcontractor upon acceptance of the head contract has been denounced
both as a contravention of contract A and an unfair practice.170
These dual rationalizations are a reflection of contemporary
ideology in which the law of contract is moving from autonomy towards
just solutions based on the parties' expectations of fair dealing.17 1 The
recognition of an overarching principle of fairness has been a critical
development in tendering cases, facilitating a more flexible remedial
focus and the ability to impose a minimum content of contractual
expectations. The philosophical shift is aptly depicted by Nicholas
Seddon: "[tihe traditional contract approach to tendering was
preoccupied with formation analysis (a normatively neutral stance)
165 John Adams and Roger Brownsword discern a similar phenomenon at work more
generally in the modem contracting environment:
Faced with modem demands for consumer protection, for some measure of protection
for reasonable pre-contractual reliance, and for greater flexibility in relation to the
ongoing adjustment of contracts, the courts have tended to maintain the rhetoric of the
classical law of contract while discreetly qualifying its substance-this has been a noble lie
but, in the long run, a practice that has impaired the rationality of the law:
J.N. Adams & R. Brownsword, Key Issues in Contract (London: Butterworths, 1995) at 205.
166 This form of judicial activism directed to upholding common assumptions on which the
parties have acted has been appropriately characterized as "bargain maintenance": P.D. Finn
"Equity and Contract" in P.D. Finn, ed., Essays on Contract (North Ryde, Australia: Law Book,
1987) at 143.
1 67
Vachon Construction,supra note 31.
168 Health CareDevelopers, supra note 25.
169

ChinookAggregates,supra note 30.

170 Fred Welsh, supra note 6.
171 See NationalCarriersLtd. v. Panalpina(Northern)Ltd, [1981] A.C. 675 at 696 (H.L.), Lord
Wilberforce.
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whereas now the focus of attention has shifted to a fair competition
"172
with a decidedly value-laden set of assumptions ....
analysis ...
As an instrument of judicial policy, fairness and good faith
eclipse the narrower forms of analysis associated with the Supreme
Court's contractual model. As owners seek to define their powers in
more expansive or explicit language, it is apparent that courts are
refusing on policy grounds to accord the words their plain meaning.
Traditional contract reasoning recedes from the picture as the subtext is
exposed. The viability of public tendering requires an orderly scheme of
mutually understood rights and obligations. In their written expression,
tendering documents seldom reflect the expectations of bidders, as nondrafting parties. The silencing of those expectations is effectively placed
beyond the reach of contract. Thus, the parties' capacity to bargain in
their own terms and, more specifically, the owner's ability to unilaterally
define the content of the relationship, has been curtailed to the extent
that it is inconsistent with the essential objectives of the tendering
exercise. As the embers of freedom of contract are extinguished, a
unitary duty of fairness is emerging from the ashes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ron Engineering cast a formerly pre-contractual phase of the
tendering process into the contractual arena. Its assimilation has been
problematic because the mechanics of tendering do not conveniently
mesh with the traditional contract paradigm.1 73 Moreover the Supreme
Court's model has been asserted in the face of an arrangement that is
largely mute as to the bidder's expectations and contemplates the
allocation of contractual benefits as the sole preserve of one party. The
imbalance is at best only partially redressed by interpretation and
implied terms. These traditional tools are deployed as a defensive
response to a scheme decreed by the owner, and although the more
obvious abuses are restrained, judicial intervention in this form is merely
palliative.

172 Seddon, supra note 51 at 212. It may be questioned, however, whether traditional analysis

is entirely bereft of normative content. See text below.
173 For example, a bid constitutes acceptance for the purpose of establishing a contractual

nexus, while at the same time retaining the form of an offer which the owner can accept or reject in
awarding the substantive contract. Again, the ubiquitous privilege clause clouds a clear definition of

the content of contract A.
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It has been increasingly recognized that the language of contract
A is an imperfect reflection of the parties' expectations. As the law of
tendering has been exposed to more liberal influences, contractual
behaviour has been assessed against general principles of fairness, good
faith and reasonable expectation. The enforcement of these standards
has marked a retreat from formalism and directed curial attention to the
matrix of facts and assumptions that more fully define the tendering
relationship.' 7 4 It would, of course, be too sweeping to suggest that
traditional contract analysis is normatively neutral. In a given case, the
decision to apply a strict or liberal construction, to adopt a purposive
interpretation, or to import implied terms, suggests the tacit promptings
of certain value judgements.75 The probem is one of degree. Orthodox
contract theory cleaves to rule-certainty. As such it is a weak medium
for change. If aspects of the tendering relationship are to be
reconfigured, then its form must be shaped by doctrines that openly
speak of an ethical standard. From this perspective it can be grasped
that the tendering relationship transcends its written expression and that
consensus is the function of a process rather than a defined event.

174
As Lord Wilberforce remarked, the time has long passed when agreements are interpreted
purely on internal linguistic considerations without reference to their essential supporting facts:
Prenn v. Simmonds, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381 at 1383-84 (H.L.).

175 See generally Bridge, supra note 131.

